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According to Canon 265 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law “it is the right of the Roman 
Pontiff, independent of civil power, to send into any part of the world Legates, with or 
without ecclesiastical jurisdiction”. In 1917 it was reasonable to refer to the independence 
of civil power, since between 1870 and 1929 – that is in the nearly sixty years between the 
cessation of the Papal States (which had been formed in 756) and the conclusion of the 
Lateran Treaty – Rome was not granted statehood but it signed a number of treaties, i.e. 
with Hungary, Romania, Poland and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Vati-
can City State was established by the Lateran Treaty, signed on 11 February 1929. Everyday 
language incorrectly does not distinguish the Vatican and the Holy Apostolic See. The 
Vatican is a ‘state’, whilst the Holy Apostolic See is an ecclesiastical organization: the Holy 
Father together with his office, the supreme authority of the Church and thus a specific 
subject of International Law. Diplomatic relations are established by the Holy See and not 
by the Vatican, therefore it is accurate to speak about the diplomatic relations of the Holy 
See and not that of the Vatican.1 
The ranks of the papal diplomats were defined by Pope Gregory XIII (1572–1585). The per-
manent diplomatic representative of the Holy Apostolic See is called Apostolic Delegate if 
he is sent to serve as a liaison with the local Church solely and thus his mission is not that 
of a diplomatic character in the strict sense of the word. If he is accredited to states and 
governments as well, his title is Nuncio in so far as he has the right to be the Doyen of 
the Diplomatic Corps in the country in question. The origin of the expression and office is 
unexplained but there are records from the 4th Century. Nunciatures in the modern sense 
were established from the end of the 15th Century. The first Papal Nuncio was sent to Ven-
ice by Pope Alexander VI in 1500. In its diplomatic relations established since 1990, those 
representatives that are not accorded precedence by the host country are called Nuncio 
by the Holy See, too. If the papal representative does not enjoy precedence within the 
diplomatic corps, his title is Pro-Nuncio (typically in the decades between 1965 and 1990) 
or Internuncio. According to diplomatic law the Nuncio and the Pro-Nuncio are rated as 
ambassadors and the rank of the Internuncio is envoy extraordinary and minister plenipo-
tentiary.2
1 Miklós RÓNAY, A Szentszék és a Vatikán Városállam viszonya a közbeszédben és a jogban, Külügyi Szemle Vol. 
3, 2004, 271–289.
2 Szabolcs Anzelm SZUROMI, Egyházi intézménytörténet, Budapest 2003, 191–193.
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The Soviet Union and the Holy See
In this analysis we would like to outline how the representatives of the Holy See, assigned 
to the East-Central European countries, could work in the new political situation after the 
Second World War. We try to set it in the context of the new social, political and geograph-
ical field, which this region entered as an area occupied by the Red Army; also mentioning 
the Soviet Church policy practice of the new alliance. 
Soviet-Russia had limited experience in the relations with the Holy See, apart from the 
1922 hunger relief contract. Moreover, the anti-Catholicism fostered by the Orthodoxy was 
inherited from tsarist Russia and it could continue to prosper, because the Soviet regime 
considered the universal and combative Roman Catholic Church a much worse institution 
than the Russian Orthodox Church, which could be administered by the police and ma-
nipulated in favour of state policy objectives. The dualism of the foreign policy of the Holy 
See during the Second World War also contributed to this distrust, because although the 
Holy See refused to declare the German attack against the Soviet Union a crusade, at the 
same time it did not condemn Nazism publicly and refused to recognize that freedom of 
conscience was guaranteed in the Soviet Union (as it was not). The Vatican regarded Ger-
many as the only power that could resist atheist communism and prevent its appearance 
in Europe. 
When the Red Army crossed the borders of the East-Central European states in 1944, So-
viet policy had to face a new and entirely unknown social and political reality: the Catholic 
Church. In Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary the overwhelming majority, in Yugoslavia 
almost half of the population has belonged to this Church for centuries. Stalin counted on 
this situation; this is why he had expressed his opinion on the Catholic Church from a strate-
gic and political point of view in a characteristic way before the Red Army marched into the 
countries of Eastern and Central-Europe. As early as in September 1943 he established a 
separate organization attached to the government to execute Church policy and maintain 
relations with the Church.3
In Stalin’s dacha on the morning of 4 September 1943 – in the presence of G. M. Malen-
kov, Secretary of the Central Committee, L. J. Beria, People’s Commissar for State Security 
(NKVD) and Colonel G. G. Karpov, head of Directorate II of the NKVD, responsible for 
intelligence (and Churches) – Stalin analysed the situation of the Russian Orthodox Church 
in detail. At the end of the conversation he remarked that it was high time that a special 
organization was established to link the Church and the government, and at the same time 
he decided on the name of the new office: Council for the Affairs of the Russian Ortho-
dox Church. Stalin laid down the following points in connection with the operation of the 
new council: it is “not a procuratorship” (referring to the Ober-Procurator, the head of the 
Church affairs in the synodical period); it must not intervene directly in Church administra-
tion, canonical and dogmatic life but it has to strengthen the independence of the Church 
through its activity and ensure the correct relation with the Patriarch; it must not “rummage 
through the pocket” of the Church, on the contrary: it has to guarantee that the Church is 
3 Mikhail V. SKAROVSKI, Russkaia Pravoslavnija Cerkov pri Staline i Khrushceve (gosudarstvennoje-cerkovnie 
otnoseniya v SSSR v 1939–1964 godah), Moscow 2005, 203. 
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“completely its own master”.4 Thus the council was set up as an organization lacking inde-
pendence, operating on the instructions of the government and reporting to it. 
The same day, a few hours later an unprecedented, historic event took place. In the Kremlin 
Stalin met orthodox prelates: Metropolitans Alexy, Nikolay and Sergius; the latter returned 
from exile in August. To their surprise, Stalin offered financial and organizational help to 
convene a regional synod to elect a new Patriarch after the 1925 death of Tikhon. Stalin 
made heartening promises regarding parishes, training of clergy, publishing Church bro-
chures and a few other matters. 
Why all this haste? The Kremlin ruler had to handle the situation that the soldiers of the Red 
Army experienced flourishing religious life in the territories liberated from under German 
occupation. On the one hand, the Church supported the defence of the fatherland and this 
support was vital to achieve victory in the war and for reconstruction; on the other, it had 
to be proved at the forthcoming Tehran Conference that there was freedom of religion in 
the Soviet Union. Stalin was a talented politician and he realized that the alleviation of the 
suppression of the Church would result in stability and foreign policy success. A section of 
the American public found it unacceptable for the USA to be allied with a “godless” state.5 
Stalin let the world know about the change strangely enough: on 28 April 1944 the newspa-
per ‘Pravda’ published a photo of Stalin and Molotov having a conversation with a Spring-
field Catholic priest, Stanislaw Orlemansky. Orlemansky, an American priest of Polish origin 
was a simple and naïve person: he walked into the Soviet Embassy in New York and applied 
for a visa, because he wanted to meet Stalin and discuss with him some questions on the 
situation of religion. In any case, the big meeting was organized: it took place on 28 April 
and 4 May. The post-war political system, the Soviet–Polish relationship and the future of 
the Catholic Church were discussed here. Stalin conspicuously avoided giving concrete an-
swers to the questions addressed to him and instead he spoke in generalities: “The people 
and the matters changed after the outbreak of the war. The war undid the conflict between 
state and Church. The believers stopped their resistance and the Soviet government gave 
up its hostile attitude towards religion. [...] There should not be any religious reprisal and 
there is not going to be any. The Soviet government carries out reprisals against those who 
persecute religion.”6
The message of Stalin was clear: the Catholic Church has not been entered onto the list of 
enemies and the Red Army is not going to import the persecution of religion and Church 
that has diminished in the Soviet Union as well since 1941, the beginning of the Great 
Patriotic War. Did this promise reach the Catholic population of the countries occupied 
by the Red Army, or those Catholics, who lived within the borders of the Soviet member 
states? Church policy was not the most important task of the war machine, and not even 
the highest promise eased immediately the anxiety that religion and believers would be 
persecuted. Perhaps the addressee of Stalin’s statements was not the population but those 
4 SKAROVSKI, 205; Tatiana VOLOKITINA – Galina MURAŠKO – Albina NOSKOVA, Moskva i Vostochnaya Evropa. 
Vlasty i cerkov v period obsestvennih transformacii 40–50-h godov XX veka, Moscow 2008, 70. 
5 Ibidem, 76. 
6 Arhiv Vniesniey Politiki Rossiyskoy Federacii (The Interior Politics Archive of Russian Fedeation; hereinafter 
referred only as AVP RF), f. 06. op. 6. p. 42. d. 548. l. 22. Minutes of the talks between Stalin, Molotov and S. 
Orlemansky, 4 May 1944.
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communist party-leaders, who had got to the centre of politics from its periphery, a lot of 
them returning home from Soviet emigration. In the spring of 1944 Stalin’s directive was 
not less than striving for dialogue and co-operation with the Churches and encouraging 
believers to collaborate with the communist party. Fundamentally this course was followed 
in everyday life after the war, in 1945–46, though never entirely. It was curbed by the brute 
force of the soldiers, who got rid of their inhibitions; as well as by the measures limiting 
the Church, introduced by the political transformations of regime in the region – the pop-
ulation found these measures injurious. In addition there was a huge obstacle: the Soviet 
Church policy objective to make Moscow the world’s religious centre. This expansive Soviet 
Church policy deemed the realization of the free practice of religion a failure, since it meant 
a conflict with the Holy See, ergo with the Catholic Churches.
Roughly simultaneously with the interview with Father Orlemansky, Stalin received the re-
port on “The situation of the Roman Catholic monasteries in the territory of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics”.7 It revealed that Catholic life had practically ceased in the 
central parts of the country. The author of the report knew about two monasteries only: 
one of them in Moscow to serve the diplomatic corps, and another one in Leningrad. The 
Greek Catholic (Unitus) Church continued to exist: in West-Ukraine and Sub-Carpathia it 
numbered 4 million believers (1997; in 399 parishes) and it was under the authority of the 
Holy See. 
The fate of the Greek Catholics was decided by the clash of two interests. Whilst the 
Vatican worried that the Greek Catholic communities would turn toward Orthodoxy, Mos-
cow suspected that Rome wanted to make these communities the starting point of the 
fight against Pravoslavism; moreover, that the Vatican wanted to create a ‘Catholic bloc’ 
in East-Central Europe that would obstruct the expansion of Soviet influence. Indeed, it 
had been a key issue of the Eastern policy of the Vatican since the 1920s: whether to fight 
against the Soviets or to convert them? To stand up against atheism with the power of 
prayer, or to lower a religious iron curtain between East and West? 
The distrust increased, because according to the information of the Council for the Affairs 
of the Russian Orthodox Church, at the end of the war the Greek Catholic prelates tried to 
restore relations with the Vatican and Pope Pius XII himself. It was an alarming possibility 
that the Greek Catholic Church might fully convert into Catholicism and give up the last 
elements of the eastern ceremony. It makes understandable the decision which was taken 
in Moscow to liquidate the Greek Catholic Church. In his report to Stalin, summarizing the 
activity of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church between 1943 and 
1946, Colonel G. G. Karpov mentioned the final liquidation of the Unitus Church in the 
Soviet Union as first point of the programme of the fight against the Vatican. The Soviet 
leadership drew up a dual objective as a preventive measure: the liberation of Catholicism 
from ‘Papism’ and establishing national Catholic Churches; and the return of the Greek 
Catholic Church to Orthodoxy. The Synod of Lviv (Lemberg) was held under pressure in 
March 1946, all the bishops having been arrested by then. The Synod annulled the 1595–
96 Union of Brest (that is the communion of a part of the Orthodox Church with the Roman 
Catholic Church) and declared the return of the Greek Catholic Church to the Russian Or-
7 VOLOKITINA – MURAŠKO – NOSKOVA, 87.
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thodox (Pravoslav) Church.8 The process did not stop at the borders of the Soviet Union. 
In Romania the Romanian government ordered the communion on 1 December 1948 and, 
as a consequence, practically the elimination of the Greek Catholic Church. The fate of the 
Greek Catholics was similar in Poland and Slovakia as well and it was probable that the 
same future awaited the Hungarian Greek Catholics. 
The foreign policy line of the Russian Pravoslav Church was absolutely clear by 1946: 1) 
fight against the Vatican as the number one enemy; 2) ecumenical movement as the basis 
of the union of Pravoslav Churches; 3) fight against certain Middle East Christian Churches 
that were considered “imperialist agents”. These strategic goals precisely reflect Moscow’s 
geostrategic aspirations. The particular interest in the Vatican and the ecumenical move-
ment served the purpose of strengthening the Soviet bloc in East-Central Europe, while 
the close attention to the patriarchates was connected with Stalin’s plans for the Mediter-
ranean, such as Greece, Turkey and Jerusalem.9 
According to a summary written in the spring of 1946, “it should be made manifest” to 
everyone, “who knows history”, that “the political intrigues of the Vatican did harm to the 
attempts of the Western world to win freedom”; and “Roman Papism, as an international 
political organization, had to be stopped”. The seven points of the document include the 
practical tasks proposed to achieve the goal. 1) Absolute separation of state and Church 
in every country; complete and unrestricted freedom of religion; every religion has the 
right to propaganda and diffusion of its dogmas. 2) Separation of state education from all 
kind of Church influence. 3) The conveyance of the estates of the Catholic Church to the 
population in those countries where the Catholics are in a majority. 4) Proportional repre-
sentation of Cardinals and other prelates in the Roman Curia on behalf of the democratic 
countries. 5) Introduction of civil marriage in every country. 6) Recall of the ambassadors of 
the Vatican, with regard to the fact that the Vatican is not an independent state.10 7) Equal 
taxation on Church property of every Church.11
Besides, the document is interesting for the sake of its date of origin, 6 May 1946. The 
opinion, or rather denunciation, of the Vatican and the Catholic Church by the Soviets 
was resolute but some indecision can be demonstrated between accusing the Vatican of 
potential friendship with imperialism and treating it as a possible ally. In one of his reports, 
describing Soviet Church policy in detail, Gyula Szekfű, Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow 
mentioned only refusal of the Holy See: “The recent Soviet government does not perse-
cute the manifestations of the life of the Greek Orthodox Church; in fact it allows these 
to appear in public on the streets… The Soviet government keeps the Greek Orthodox 
Church under strict control, and according to public belief, the students, or some of the 
students of the newly-established Theological College are enlisted as agents of the secret 
8 VOLOKITINA – MURAŠKO – NOSKOVA, 372–390; Philipe CHENAUX, L’Église catholique et communisme en 
Europe (1917–1989). De Lénine à Jean-Paul II, Paris 2009, 206.
9 VOLOKITINA – MURAŠKO – NOSKOVA, 91–92.
10 In the socialist countries it was considered legally evident that the Holy See does not have international sub-
jectivity. See the summary of the standpoints on the issue: Miklós RÓNAY, Az egységesség elve a katolikus egyház 
külügyi tevékenységében. PhD dissertation, Corvinus University, Budapest 2006, 11–17.
11 Gosudarstvennyj Arhiv Rossiskoj Federacii (The Russian Federation State Archive; hereinafter referred only as 
GARF), f. 6991. op. 1. d. 77. l. 300. 9 May 1946 n. 129. Politika Vatikana vo vtoroj mirovoj vajne – summary by 
Leo Leman. Conclusions. 
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police. While the Soviet government remarkably favours the Orthodox Church, at least on 
the surface, it is reserved, rigid and in fact hostile towards the Roman Church. For that very 
reason the head of the Greek Catholic Church is allowed to have contacts with the heads 
of the non-Catholic Christian Churches (e. g. the visit of the Archbishop of Canterbury to 
Moscow and the return of the visit by the Patriarch), whereas any contact or rapprochement 
with the Vatican is prohibited.”12 Szekfű also reported that the Soviet government made 
efforts to create national Churches and to use them for its own political purposes. 
In contrast with this, some Western researchers think that the Soviet government repeat-
edly renewed its exploratory talks with Rome till 1947. As proof they refer to the activity of 
two Hungarian Jesuits, József P. Jánosi and Töhötöm P. Nagy.13 Töhötöm P. Nagy appealed 
to Malinovsky, Soviet marshal, the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the political 
officers transferred to the country, asking protection for the Catholic organizations. They 
saw potentials in the network of monks reaching to Rome. Töhötöm Nagy, who was familiar 
with the Great Powers relations and did not recoil from risky actions, had travelled incog-
nito to Rome five times by the autumn of 1946, once with American safe conduct, another 
time with a Papal passport or as a civilian but on each occasion with the knowledge of the 
Soviet authorities.14 Moscow even offered a certain “general agreement”, to be followed 
by agreements between the Vatican and the East-Central European countries. Heinrich 
Wienken (1883–1961), who later became Bishop of Meissen, monitored in a similar way; in 
the post-war years he met various Soviet military officers thirty-five times (!) and subtly he 
reached important guarantees for the East-German Catholic Church.15 However, in Mos-
cow the attempts – originating partly from tradition – to annul networking, proved stronger 
than networking itself; and with the evolution of the Cold War the former prevailed. 
In the Soviet Sphere of Influence
In the interwar period the Holy See – as a supranational, supreme Church administration, 
leading the Catholic world – concluded concordats with some countries of the East-Central 
European region, such as Poland (1925), Romania (1929), the German Reich (1933), Austria 
(1934) and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1935);16 it signed modus vi-
vendi with Czechoslovakia (1928) and concluded the Lateran Treaty with Italy (1929). In the 
case of the Hungarian Kingdom, a so-called ‘intesa semplice’ entered into force in 1927 
that was not a bilateral, international treaty, this is why it is called ‘simple agreement’.17 De-
12 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (The State Archives of The National Archives of Hungary, herei-
nafter referred only as MNL–OL), XIX-J-1-j-Szovjetunió-IV-270, Box No. 14. The report of Gyula Szekfű to foreign 
minister János Gyöngyösi, Moscow, 29 April 1946.
13 Hansjakob STEHLE, Geheimdiplomatie im Vatikan. Die Päpste und die Kommunisten, Zürich 1993, 241.
14 Országos Széchényi Könyvtár Kézirattára (National Széchényi Library, Manuscript Collection, hereinafter refe-
rred only as OSzKK), 216. f., c. u. 20, fol. 1–76, Diary notes, 1 July 1946 – 1 January 1947.
15 STEHLE, 245.
16 In the end this concordat was not enacted, because under pressure from the Serbian Orthodox Church the 
relating bill was not introduced to the Yugoslav Senate. 
17 Fundamentally it meant that from 1918 onwards the Holy See had the right to appoint prelates but the Hun-
garian government was entitled to make previous comments on filling the church positions subordinate to Rome 
and to propose suitable people within two months after the seat had become vacant.
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pending on their legal classification, in the above-mentioned countries these documents 
determined the situation of the Catholic Church, the degree of its privileges and the rela-
tionship between secular power and Church. On the one hand, the principles guaranteed 
the independence of the Catholic Church from the state and its free communication with 
the Holy See; on the other hand, they determined the obligations of the state towards the 
Church, especially in the field of education, management of Church property (untouchable) 
and family law.18
What kind of an example was set by the practice followed in the countries in the Soviet 
sphere of influence? Apparently it was varied. Yet in general it is true that between 1944/45 
and 1947/48 it was in the interests of nearly every East-Central European government 
to show religious tolerance to some extent and maintain connections with the Holy See. 
Marxism was not an insurmountable obstacle for the Holy See, since it had – and has in 
these days, too – diplomatic relations with Muslim countries as well. Rome distinguishes 
between governments and ideologies; namely, it represents an intransigent position as re-
gards ethical or religious principles, at the same time it does not refuse to enter into nego-
tiations with any political figure or group. However, in the long run the Papal Nunciatures 
were not allowed to remain in the countries of the Soviet sphere of influence, whether or 
not the given country was on the winning or losing side of the war. 
Hungary
The liaison between Hungary and the Holy See dates back to the Middle Ages, when the 
Hungarian diocesan system was organized in cooperation between King Saint Stephen 
and the Holy See. The establishment of diplomatic relations in the modern sense arose 
for the first time during Rákóczi’s War of Independence. Later, after the dissolution of the 
Austro–Hungarian Monarchy the question arose again, when the establishment of diplo-
matic relations with the Holy See meant a chance to escape international isolation. The 
Holy See established diplomatic relations with the successor states promptly: a Nuncio for 
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was sent to Belgrade on 2 March 1920 and 
the Prague Nuncio was appointed on 7 May 1920. The first Hungarian Ambassador to the 
Holy See, count József Somssich presented his credentials to Pope Benedict XV and by 
this ceremony the official opening of the Embassy of Hungary to the Holy See took place. 
Lorenzo Schioppa, until then Bavarian Nuncio, became the first Nuncio to Hungary and he 
presented his credentials to Regent Miklós Horthy on 6 October 1920. Between 1920 and 
1945 this highest diplomatic relation enabled the peaceful negotiated solution of sensitive 
18 A few examples from the remarkably rich specialised literature: Konkordat zawarty pomiędzy Stolicą Apo-
stolską a Rzecząpospolitą Polską podpisany w Rzymie dnia 10 lutego 1925 r., Lwów 1925; Ludwig VOLK, Das 
Reichskonkordat vom 20. Juli 1933. Von den Ansätzen in der Weimarer Republik bis zur Ratifizierung am 10. 
September 1933, Mainz 1972. (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte, Reihe B: Forschungen, Bd. 
5); Konkordátum a Szentszék és a Német Birodalom között (1933. július 20.), in: István NÉMETH, Demokrácia és 
diktatúra Németországban, 1918–1945 2. kötet. A “Harmadik Birodalom”, 1933–1945. Összegzés és dokumen-
tumok, Budapest 2007; GARF, f. 6410. op. 1. d. 69. l. 1–2. Proekt konkordata 1935 g. Vatikana s korolevstvom ser-
bov, horvatov, szlovencev; Modus vivendi. Úmluva mezi republikou Československou a Svatou stolicí zjednána v 
lednu 1928 [online]. http://spcp.prf.cuni.cz/dokument/modus.htm (Visited: 18 February 2012); Iván POLZOVICS, 
A lateráni szerződés. A szentszék nemzetközi jogi helyzete, Budapest 1934 (Szt. István könyvek 114.) [online].
http://www.ppek.hu/konyvek/Polzovics_Ivan_A_laterani_szerzodes_1.pdf (Visited: 28 May 2014).
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Church policy issues, in particular the appointments of prelates and the division of the di-
ocese that had been cut in two by the frontiers.19
Diplomatic relations were undisturbed till 1944–45. After the Second World War Hungary 
became part of the Soviet sphere of influence and the flexibility left to Hungarian foreign 
policy was reduced. “It is a serious loss for the Hungarian Catholic Church that Archbishop 
Angelo Rotta, Apostolic Nuncio was forced to leave his post on 6 Apr[il]”, reported József 
Grősz, Archbishop of Kalocsa on the first conference of the Hungarian Bench of Bishops, 
held after the war, on 24 May 1945.20 Today we can resolve the discrepancy of the resourc-
es and pronounce that this measure was taken not by the Provisional National Government 
but by the Allied Control Commission (ACC) under command of the Allied (Soviet) High 
Command. The most convincing evidence for this is a military record of 1 March 1945 
about the diplomats and representatives of foreign organizations who remained in Buda-
pest. On the list there were only six names and the last one was Gennaro Verolino, Uditore, 
who was a colleague of Angelo Rotta, Apostolic Nuncio. V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs added the following instruction to the report: “Нужно выпроводить этих господин 
из Венгрии. Проследите за этим.”21 The realization of the Soviet measure is confirmed by 
the report of the person concerned, Angelo Rotta, Apostolic Nuncio. According to this, 
on 22 March 1945 two Russian employees of the Allied Control Commission ordered him 
to leave within three days, after the embassies of the other neutral states (Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey) had received similar instructions.22
According to the diary notes of Töhötöm Nagy, Jesuit, even Voroshilov himself was reluc-
tant to order the expulsion, he did not want to undertake the responsibility all by himself, 
19 See the following non-exhaustive list of sources on the issue: Andor CSIZMADIA, A magyar állam és az egyhá-
zak jogi kapcsolatainak alakulása és gyakorlata a Horthy-korszakban, Budapest 1966; Péter ERDŐ, A Szentszék és 
Magyarország, in: Katolikus Szemle, 43, 1991, 3–4, 140–148; István ZOMBORI (ed.), Magyarország és a Szentszék 
kapcsolatának ezer éve, Budapest 1996; Lapo LOMBARDI, La Santa Sede e i cattolici dell’Europa Orientale agli 
albori della guerra fredda, Róma–Budapest 1997; István ZOMBORI (ed.), Le relazioni diplomatiche tra l’Ungheria 
e la Santa Sede 1920–2000, Budapest 2001; Jenő GERGELY, A magyarországi katolikus egyház és a külpolitika 
(1948–1990), in: Magyar külpolitikai gondolkodás a 20. században, Pál PRITZ (ed.), Budapest 2006, 39–59; Péter 
TUSOR (ed.), Magyarország és a római Szentszék. (Források és távlatok.) Tanulmányok Erdő bíboros tiszteletére, 
Budapest–Róma 2012 (Bibliotheca historiae ecclesiasticae Universitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány nuncupatae. 
Series 1., Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae. Classis 1/8.).
20 Margit BEKE (ed.), A magyar katolikus püspökkari tanácskozások története és jegyzőkönyvei 1945–1948 között, 
Köln–Budapest 1996, 28. The minutes of the conference of the Bench of Bishops, convened for 24 May 1945. 
21 “These gentlemen must be showed to the door. Pay attention.” AVP RF, f. 06. op. 7. p. 28. d. 371. l. 6. No. 
44038 report of the Deputy Commanding Officer of the Red Army to V. M. Molotov, 1 March 1945 and the in-
structions of Molotov addressed to Dekanezov, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, 8 March 1945. (The names 
of several diplomats who remained in Budapest were not included in the list, among others that of the superior 
of Verolino, Nuncio Angelo Rotta. Under war circumstances it must have been difficult to identify the person of 
each diplomat precisely and completely.)
22 Tomislav MRKONJIĆ, Archivio della Nunziatura Apostolica in Ungheria (1920–1939). Gli archivi della Santa 
Sede e il Regno d‘Ungheria (secc. 15–20). A cura di Gaetano Platania – Matteo Sanfilippo – Péter Tusor, Buda-
pest–Roma 2008, 259. (Bibliotheca Historiae Ecclesiasticae Uiversitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány Nuncupatae. 
Ser. 1., Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae. Classis 1.) The author, a research worker of the Vatican Secret Archives, 
summarizes the events based on the most reliable sources; he quotes the reports of Rotta of 25 March 1945 and 
21 April 1945, addressed to Tardini, deputy under-secretary of state, that have not been made public yet. The 
contents of the report accord with the contemporary diary of P. Nagy, Töhötöm S. J.: OSzKK, 216. f., c. u. 19, 
notebook 4, note of 23 March 1945.
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so he asked Moscow but he got a negative answer.23 In the end, on 4 April 1945, Angelo 
Rotta Papal Nuncio was declared ‘persona non grata’ for the second time, this time finally. 
That morning two other Russian officials visited the Nuncio and told him that no exceptions 
could be made. He got 48 hours to leave.24 The following day, on 5 April the Nuncio met 
József Grősz, Archbishop of Kalocsa in Budapest. In his diary Grősz gave a different expla-
nation for the decision: “The reason: the recent government has no ambassadors abroad, 
consequently the foreign countries are not allowed to have ambassadors here. The real 
reason: Moscow does not want witnesses to what is going on here.”25
According to Béla Ispánki, who was found guilty of spying in the trial of Mindszenty, Rotta 
said to the priests present after the funeral ceremony of Cardinal Primate Serédi that in a 
polite letter Voroshilov had offered him to stay in Budapest “as a private person, a wel-
come guest” but not as a diplomat, which Rotta, while with regrets, did not accept. As 
far as he knew, the Soviet government insisted that in its own occupation zone only those 
countries were allowed to have diplomatic missions, which maintained normal diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union.26
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland
While the flexibility left to Hungary was reduced by the Armistice Agreement signed on 
20 January 1945, the usual work of foreign representations and propaganda organs in the 
victorious Central-European countries was undisturbed. Diplomatic relations between the 
Holy See and the victorious states such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland were not 
interrupted in law or in fact. 
Czechoslovakia immediately expressed its readiness to renew diplomatic relations and the 
Holy See responded positively. In the summer of 1945 the Holy See officially confirmed the 
credentials of Raffaele Forni, the Chargé d’Affaires of the Nunciature in Prague and in the 
summer of 1946 the Pope accepted the credentials of the new Czechoslovakian Ambassa-
dor.27 The situation changed after the Communist takeover on 24 January 1948. Josef Be-
ran, Archbishop of Prague could not ignore the measures against Church and religion and 
in the course of the preparation of the new constitution he addressed a letter to the Presi-
dent of the Republic, wherein he made clear that the Catholic institutions formed integral 
parts of Church life and asked the clarification of the legal and practical situation of these 
institutions, which is essential to maintain the relationship with the Holy See. He hoped for 
an improvement as regards the attacks against the Pope, too.28 “In return for it” he was 
arrested and put under house arrest and simultaneously the Czechoslovak government 
asked the Holy See to recall its Chargé d’Affaires. Therefore in Prague the interruption of 
23 OSzKK, 216. f., c. u. 19, notebook 4, Diary of P. Nagy, Töhötöm S. J., 5 April 1945.
24 MRKONJIĆ, 260.
25 József TÖRÖK (ed.), Grősz József kalocsai érsek naplója 1944–1946. S. a. r., Budapest, n. d. [1995], 192. 
26 Béla ISPÁNKI, Az évszázad pere, Abaliget 1995, 36.
27 Karel KAPLAN, Stát a církev v Československu. 1948–1953, Brno 1994, 10. 
28 A katolikus egyház Csehszlovákiában, in: L’Osservatore Romano, 88, 1948, 154, 5–6.
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diplomatic relationships was accompanied by an internal purge.29
In Yugoslavia Marshall Tito started a radical, revolutionary Church policy immediately. On 
the territories reoccupied by the partisans 2 bishops, 243 priests, 19 clergymen, 7 friars 
and nuns were killed by September of 1945; 164 priests were arrested and 89 priests 
disappeared.30 Alojzije Viktor Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb was arrested in May 1945. 
He was accused of collaboration with the pro-Nazi Ustasha regime of Ante Pavelić in the 
Croat puppet state during the Second World War, when masses of Serbs and Muslims were 
killed; also, he was accused of approving the forced conversion of Orthodox Serbs into Ca-
tholicism. Later he was set free but he was arrested again in September 1946, after he had 
refused the concept of Marshall Tito to establish a Serbo–Croat National Catholic Church, 
independent from Rome. After a two-week trial, on 11 October 1946 he was sentenced to 
sixteen years forced labour with the charge of high treason and war crimes.31 After the first 
arrest of the Archbishop, the Vatican realized that they had to contact Tito immediately. 
By 1944 the Holy See recognized the royal government-in-exile but after the agreement 
between the partisans and the émigrés, official Vatican circles asserted that the Papal rec-
ognition of Tito’s government was possible.32 Thus the main obstacle to sending a Vatican 
ambassador was removed. The diplomat exchange took place in 1945.
The Holy See’s first Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Bishop of Florida, Joseph Patrick Hur-
ley, arrived to Belgrade on 22 October 1945. Although his presence could not prevent the 
second arrest and sentencing of the Archbishop of Zagreb, the Holy See did not break 
relations with Yugoslavia. Years later, it was Tito who did so: he perceived as provocation 
that the Pope created Stepinac, who was serving his sentence, a Cardinal; this is why Silvio 
Oddi, the Chargé d’Affaires of the Belgrade Nunciature had to leave on 17 December 
1952.33 Why had the Holy See been so patient with Yugoslavia for years? It is true, that 
diplomatic relations, burdened by a few conflicts, had been in danger since 1947. Marshall 
Tito explained to an American Protestant Church delegation that the improvement of the 
relationship between Yugoslavia and the Holy See depended merely on Rome but there 
were no signs of it and this situation could result in a break. According to Tito, the main 
reason for this situation was that the Catholic Church had lost its earlier influence that it 
had enjoyed in the period of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy; and he also mentioned a 
few other reasons, e.g. economic reasons, especially the land reform that crucially affected 
Church property.34 However, the split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union took place 
then. It seems that precisely this split explains the reasons, because the Yugoslav separate 
way within the Soviet bloc gave hope to Rome that Tito was going to follow a separate way 
in his Church policy, too. 
Similarly to Czechoslovakia, the Holy See did not have an official diplomatic representative 
29 CHENAUX, 211.
30 VOLOKITINA – MURAŠKO – NOSKOVA, 488.
31 GARF, f. 6991. op. 1. d. 134. l. 74. Abstract from the article by V. IVANOVA, Demokratitseskoye preobrazovanij 
v Jugoslaviji, Bolsevik, 1947, 2, 49; CHENAUX, 208.
32 VOLOKITINA – MURAŠKO – NOSKOVA, 489.
33 STEHLE, 243–244.
34 GARF, f. 6991. op. 1. d. 134. l. 139–140. Marshall Tito received American Protestant leaders, 3 August 1947 
(TASS report, 6 August 1947).
98 Diplomatic Missions of the Holy See in Hungaryand East-Central Europe after the Second World WarMargit BALOGH
ARTICLES
in Poland – in legal terms at the time of the restoring of statehood – in 1945. However, 
on 20 July 1945, despite the protests of the London Polish government-in-exile, August 
Hlond, Archbishop of Poznań-Gniezno, Cardinal Primate, who had been interned to France 
by the Germans in 1942, was allowed to return. On 7 July 1945 in Rome Domenico Tardini, 
the Secretary of the First Section of the Papal Secretariat of State gave authorization (facul-
tas specialis) to Hlond for jurisdiction “on the entire Polish territory” and the status of a pa-
pal legate, i.e. ambassador.35 It must be mentioned that German historians dispute the fact 
of the authorization, respectively its scope. This authorization – if it existed – did not state 
explicitly whether it applied to Poland within its 1939 borders (as the 1925 Concordat ap-
plied to these), or to the new borders, changed in 1945. In accordance with the legal prac-
tice of the Holy See, it could apply to such territories only that fell under the 1925 Polish 
Concordat; the Holy See considered that in the 1933 Concordat with the German Reich as 
well. The only exception was the Gdańsk (Danzig) Episcopate, since Gdańsk (Danzig) as an 
exempted episcopate (exempt) in terms of jurisdiction was placed under the Warsaw Nun-
cio in 1925. The Potsdam Conference (17 July 1945 – 2 August 1945) had barely closed, 
when on 15 August Cardinal Hlond, referring to the special authorization received from the 
Holy See, appointed five Polish prelates as Apostolic Administrators for the former German 
Reich territories that were annexed to the Polish state, east from the Oder–Neisse border. 
Despite his efforts, the Warsaw government did not consider his measure as recognition 
of the new borders of the Polish state and the Provisional Government by the Vatican. The 
Holy See did not join the decision of the Potsdam Conference, with which the Allies with-
drew their recognition from the Polish émigré government in London and they established 
diplomatic relations with the Warsaw Provisional Government instead. 
In return the Polish Government in Warsaw did not recognize the appointment of the 
Apostolic Administrators and on 14 September 1945 it denounced the 1925 Concordat, 
arguing that it was the Holy See that had one-sidedly infringed it with the appointment 
of an ethnic German bishop, respectively an administrator as heads of Chełmno (Holm, 
Kulm) and Poznań-Gniezno, Polish episcopates.36 The background of the short justification 
is the fate of Poland during the World War. In the autumn of 1939 Gdańsk (Danzig) Free 
City, later the Western territories of Poland, were annexed to the German Reich and the 
Catholic Church structure was also adversely affected, because due to the occupation, 
certain Church Governance districts were disannexed. In the merged territories vigorous 
Germanization started, including the destruction of the Polish Church structure. After the 
Bishop of Chełmno diocese had gone into exile, in December 1940 the Holy See entrusted 
the Bishop of Gdańsk (Danzig), Karol Maria Splett of German origin, famous for anti-Polish 
feelings, with the governance of the diocese as Apostolic Administrator. With this measure 
Rome violated the Concordat, because according to its Article 9 – similarly to the Czech 
and Romanian agreements – not a single district of the Polish Republic was allowed to 
be under the authority of such a bishop, who was staying outside the borders of the Pol-
ish state. According to the Provisional Government of Poland, with the appointment Pius 
XII practically recognized Hitler’s plunders in Poland. The division of the Poznań-Gniezno 
35 Jan KOPIEC, Polen, in: Kirche und Katholizismus seit 1945. Band 2. Ostmittel-, Ost- und Südosteuropa, Erwin 
GATZ (ed.), Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich 1999, 103.
36 STEHLE, 239.
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episcopate was also seriously criticized. Namely, the Vatican, worrying about the expul-
sion of the Polish population and the annihilation of the Church, appointed an Apostolic 
Administrator for the German nationality (at first Józef Paech, later Lorenz Breitinger), and 
separately, another one for the Polish nationality (Bishop Walenty Dymek).37 In 1945 it was 
interpreted as a violation of Article 9, because the Catholic hierarchy of the Polish Repub-
lic could not have been divided on the basis of nationality, except for the ritual.38 In this 
justification the sensitivity of Poles can be perceived. The inviolability of borders was of 
the greatest importance for the country, which regained its statehood after the First World 
War – likewise for the newly formed Czechoslovakia. This is why a provision was included 
in the agreements between these countries and the Vatican that the Church Governance 
division must be consistent with the borders, and the centres of the diocese must be within 
the borders. 
However, there could be a different interpretation as well: that the Holy See acted the same 
way in Poland as in Northern Italy during the Nazi occupation. Namely, the Vatican did not 
want to collaborate with the current regime, because this could have been explained as 
recognition of the Nazi occupation, so it refrained from the appointment of new bishops 
and entrusted Apostolic Administrators with the control of the episcopates. In Poland the 
areas concerned had mixed populations and were near the German border, therefore the 
Administrators were chosen from the German ethnic group. Thus using the disputed and 
really controversial war-time appointments as an excuse, the Warsaw government can-
celled the Concordat and broke the diplomatic relationship, which foreshadowed the out-
set of the merciless laicization. 
The 26 September 1945 issue of the “L’Osservatore Romano” published a communiqué 
about the issue of the Polish Concordat and tried to rebut the accusations against the Vat-
ican. It argued that the measures concerning the Gniezno and Poznań episcopates were 
taken in an extraordinary situation ensuing from the German occupation and were neces-
sitated by the requirement that the believers needed a spiritual leader. Subsequently, the 
communiqué briefly recited the violations of the terms of the Concordat by the Provisional 
Government of Poland: the episcopate, the priesthood and the believers were forbidden 
from direct contact with the Holy See (Article 2 of the Concordat); bishops and priests were 
arrested (Articles 20 and 22); private individuals and Church institutions were not paid the 
subsidies (Article 24). About the recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by 
the Vatican the communiqué states as follows: “the fact that the bilateral agreement was 
violated, excludes the assumption that they expect recognition.”39 Indeed Rome did not 
yield: the Nuncio in the person of Archbishop Filippo Cortesi was sent to the Polish gov-
ernment-in-exile in London and not to Warsaw. To be more precise, the Vatican did not 
change the person of the Nuncio, since Cortesi had administered this office since 1936 
but after the outbreak of the Second World War he was forced to live in Poland. He held 
the title of Nuncio until his death in 1947. After his death the Holy See did not appoint a 
37 Jerzy KŁOCZOWSKI – Lidia MŰLLEROWA – Jan SKARBEK, A katolikus egyház Lengyelországban, Budapest 
1994, 346–351. (Ecclesia Sancta 8.) 
38 AVP RF, f. 56b. op. 6. p. 45. d. 60. The communiqué of the Government of Poland about the relations with the 
Vatican (TASS report, Warsaw, 14 September 1945); VOLOKITINA – MURAŠKO – NOSKOVA, 512–513. 
39 AVP RF, f. 56b. op. 6. p. 45. d. 60. News agency report, 27 September 1945.
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new Nuncio; this position has now been filled again since 1975, at first by Archbishop Luigi 
Poggi. 
With the termination of the Concordat the Communist-dominated government deprived 
Catholic Poland of the instrument of cooperation with the Vatican and this was alarming for 
the other Central and East-European countries, where conditions were similar. The Polish 
Catholic Church was deprived of its status guaranteed by international law, simultaneously, 
no governmental approval was necessary for the appointment of bishops. Presumably, 
sending a Nuncio to Warsaw, thereby recognizing the new government of Poland, would 
not have saved the Catholic Church from later conflicts. Nevertheless, the maintenance 
of the relationship would have probably reduced the Soviet pressure on the country, and 
perhaps those national communists would have been strengthened, which regarded the 
1950 compromise agreement with the Church not only as a manoeuvre.
Under Pius XII not only the Polish government-in-exile in London but also the Lithuanian 
government-in-exile could continue to operate their Vatican missions, so from the point of 
view of the Vatican both countries had legally valid diplomatic missions there. The situation 
changed in 1958, when according to long-term custom, new credentials were necessary 
to the new Pope (John XXIII) and these were not accepted from the governments-in-exile 
by the Secretariat of State. Supposedly, the underlying cause was a consultation between 
Pope John XXIII and Polish Cardinal Wysyński; as a consequence the Pope decided to 
refuse the credentials issued by the Polish and the Lithuanian governments-in-exile. Thus 
the representation of the two emigrant governments to the Vatican practically terminated. 
Nevertheless, Poland and Lithuania were not erased from the list of names of diplomatic 
missions but there was neither ambassador nor envoy or any other diplomatic rank indicat-
ed under the names of these countries. Only a Chargé d’Affaires was indicated but after 
the colon a horizontal line showed that in reality this position was not fulfilled. That was 
all that the Polish and Lithuanian emigrants, seriously supported by the Americans, could 
achieve. “If all this proves to be true, a typical diplomatic solution of the Vatican will be 
added to the documentation of clerical hypocrisy”, remarked the Hungarian Ambassador 
to Rome.40 The Vatican did not recognize the ambassadorial rank of the representatives of 
the two governments-in-exile and they were regarded and addressed simply as managers 
(gerente); besides, the Holy See did not send representatives to these governments (until 
1972 Kazimierz Papée was the representative of the Polish government-in-exile to the Holy 
See).41 Diplomatic relations were re-established only with the collapse of the Soviet Empire, 
in 1989. 
Romania
After Romania switched sides to the Allies on 23 August 1944, the king remained in of-
fice, and the members of the diplomatic corpses accredited to him also did so, with the 
suspension of their diplomatic rights. Thus the country had an opportunity to maintain its 
representation in every neutral country. Accordingly, the Italian Andrea Cassulo, who had 
40 MNL–OL, XIX-J-1-j-001221 1945–64. Italy (Box No. 10, item 5/c). The report of Gyula Simó, Ambassador to 
Rome, 28 January 1958.
41 KOPIEC, 104.
101CENTRAL EUROPEAN PAPERS 2014 / II / 1
been Nuncio to Bucharest since 1936, continued to serve there. What was unimaginable 
in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church, in the case of the Orthodox Romanians was 
not: (in the expectation of power) the two, earlier rival Christian Churches were able to form 
an anti-government and anti-Soviet front. It was suspicious that at the beginning of 1946 
Apostolic Nuncio Andrea Cassulo and Alexandru Theodor Cisar, Archbishop of the Bucha-
rest Latin Archdiocese visited the Roman Patriarch, Nicodim Munteanu, who was a militant 
anti-communist. According to certain sources, Cassulo and Cisar presented Patriarch Nico-
dem with an anniversary medal from the Pope and offered him the title of “the Cardinal of 
the East”, thus enabling him to negotiate with Rome on behalf of all the Eastern-European 
Orthodox Churches.42 The authorities tried to compromise Cassulo in connection with the 
judicial proceedings against Marshall Ion Antonescu, who was executed as war criminal. 
Consequently, Cassulo practically became persona non grata in Romania and in 1946 the 
Holy See appointed Internuncio Gerald Patrick O’Hara, earlier Bishop of Savannah, as his 
successor. Despite the difficulties, until his departure in March 1947 Nuncio Cassulo pro-
tected the safety of the Roman Catholic Church and maintained a relationship with the 
Romanians, especially with politicians and diplomats, while the Romanian officials – like 
gradually everywhere in East-Central-Europe – presumed that the Apostolic Nunciature 
in Bucharest was a sort of intelligence agency of the Vatican. From the summer of 1947 
remarkably many priests were accused of spying; moreover, after the departure of Cassulo 
the authorities suspected the new Internuncio, O’Hara and his colleagues, Guido del Me-
stri and John C. Kirk as foreign agents.43
On 17 July 1948 Decree No. 151, consisting of one article only, denounced the Concor-
dat between Romania and the Holy See. “The Concordat concluded between the Pope 
and Romania on 10 May 1927, as well as the additional agreements in connection with 
the entry into force of the Concordat, lapse with the announcement of the present law. 
From this date the mandatory nature and application of the Concordat and the additional 
agreements and measures cease. The law of 12 June 1927 that ratified the Concordat, as 
well as the additional laws confirming the agreement, lapse.“44 The relationship between 
the Catholic Church of Romania and the Holy See was fundamentally cut by Article 4 of 
the Law on Religion, accepted on 4 August; it stipulated that religious communities or 
their leaders are banned from maintaining foreign relations, unless they have permission 
from the Ministry of Religion, through the Foreign Ministry. In 1950 Nuncio Gerald Patrick 
O’Hara was expelled from Bucharest on the charge of espionage, which is an entirely new 
element in the justification of the cessation of the East-Central European Nunciatures. If he 
had stayed there, without doubt he would have been among the victims of the show trials 
that spread in those days.
42 Cristian VASILE, The Apostolic Nunciature in Romania at the beginning of the communist regime, in: Instituto 
Romeno Di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica (Venezia) Annuario Vol. 4, Şerban MARIN – Ion BULEI – Rudolf DINU 
(eds.), Bucarest 2002, 256–257.
43 Ibidem, 259.
44 GARF, f. 6991. op. 1. d. 733. l. 69. The legal status of the Churches in Romania. On top of the page in hand-
writing: Из журнала Ведомости польск[ой] пр[авославной] ц[ерк]ви 6–12, 1948 г. стр. 39.
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Albania, Bulgaria
After the Second World War, in those states of the Eastern bloc where the Muslim or Or-
thodox religion was in a majority, the Diplomatic Missions of the Holy See worked only for 
a short time – similarly to the countries with a Catholic tradition. Leone Nigris, the Apostolic 
Delegate to Tirana was expelled in May 1945, and in the course of time Enver Hoxha’s Al-
bania became the first “atheist state” as declared in the constitution. In Bulgaria, which was 
also defeated in the war, the Holy See had a Permanent Representative without diplomatic 
status since 1925, at first as Apostolic Visitor, since 1931 as Apostolic Delegate. Until 1934 
Agostino Roncalli, the later Pope John XXIII held this position and he was succeeded by 
Giuseppe Mazzoli; after his sudden death (8 December 1945) the duties were performed 
by a provisional delegate, who was not allowed to return after one of his trips abroad.45 The 
Allied Control Commission approved the re-establishment of relations with Austria, as the 
sole country from among those under the control of the ACC. Thus a Papal Legate contin-
ued to serve in Austria and an Austrian Ambassador in the Vatican, although the debate 
continued between the two sides on the validity of the 1934 Concordat.
Attempts at the Normalisation of Diplomatic Relations Between 
Hungary and the Holy See46
With the expulsion of Angelo Rotta in April 1945, the communication between the Hungar-
ian Bench of Bishops and the Holy See became more difficult. Soon after József Mindsz-
enty was appointed Archbishop of Esztergom, in his letter of 10 October he requested 
the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Pope Pius XII.47 The two most influential 
personalities of the Secretariat of State approached the request constructively, Montini 
even said: “The Holy See is looking forward to the day, when the Hungarian government 
will request the re-establishment of the Nunciature. Although it is true that His Excellency 
the Nuncio was expelled by the Soviet and not by the Hungarian government, it is the 
latter that has to take the first step, because it knows whether the Soviets will expel the 
representative of the Holy Father again or allow him to enter the country. Moreover, the 
government can give the guarantees asked by the Holy See once again, that is the immu-
nity of the members of its diplomatic corps, the extraterritoriality of the building and free 
contact with the Vatican. The Holy See does not claim more or better housing and services 
45 Gerhard FEIGE, Bulgarien, in: Kirche und Katholizismus seit 1945, II. Ostmittel-, Ost- und Südosteuropa, Erwin 
GATZ (ed.), Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich 1999, 58; http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bmazzoli.html 
(Visited: 28 May 2014). 
46 Margit BALOGH, A szentszéki–magyar kapcsolatok a koalíció (1945–1949) éveiben, in: Magyarország és a ró-
mai Szentszék. Magyarország és a római Szentszék. (Források és távlatok.) Tanulmányok Erdő bíboros tiszteletére, 
Budapest–Róma 2012 (Bibliotheca historiae ecclesiasticae Universitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány nuncupatae. 
Series 1., Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae. Classis 1/8.), 367–426.
47 Prímási Levéltár, Esztergom (Esztergom Primatial Archives; hereinafter referred only as EPL), Processus Joseph 
Card. Mindszenty, V-700/27, fol. 248, József Mindszenty’s letter to Pope Pius XII, Esztergom, 10 October 1947. 
The same in handwritten draft: V-700/32, fol. 2. (Duplicate: Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára [ÁBTL, 
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security] 3.1.9. V-700/27. and 32.)
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than which is afforded to the other Hungarians at present.”48
The Prince Primate did not wait for the official answer and on 27 October he informed 
Prime Minister Béla Miklós de Dálnok that he himself wanted to invite the Holy See to 
re-establish diplomatic relations urgently – as he had done so by then. The reply of the 
government was not negative.49 Following the National Assembly elections of November 
1945, the new Prime Minister, Zoltán Tildy, as soon as he had introduced his government 
in the Parliament, paid a visit to Prince Primate József Mindszenty, accompanied by Priest 
Béla Varga, politician of the Smallholders Party – that was reminiscent of bygone days. The 
Prince Primate explained that he opposed the issue of the republican form of government 
being raised, and if that could not be postponed, he would propose a referendum. His 
guests agreed with him and then Tildy conveyed the government’s wish “to establish dip-
lomatic relations with the Vatican as soon as possible”.50
The first steps were taken towards the normalisation of the relationship. Nevertheless, the 
Hungarian government did not seize the opportunity to receive the Nuncio in the more 
favourable atmosphere in the period between the armistice and the peace treaty; and did 
not convey sufficiently the wish of the entire Catholic society to the Allied Control Com-
mission. At the same time, the Prince Primate did not leave any room for doubts that he 
wished to take the initiative. 
The Prince Primate had the opportunity to intermediate during his two visits to Rome. 
The first visit took place between 29 November and 13 December 1945, the second one 
between 18 February and 18 March 1946. In his memoirs he does not separates the two 
visits regarding the forming of diplomatic relations, although in the meantime his judgment 
changed considerably. Mindszenty made a diagnosis of Hungarian Catholicism on the first 
papal audience. “When I said that the Prime Minister of the new government requested 
the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Holy See, he wanted to take action 
immediately in order that Angelo Rotta depart for Budapest.”51 The memoirs continue 
with Mindszenty’s doubts: “But his face darkened when I revealed my suspicions about 
this case.”52 Actually, Mindszenty also mentioned his suspicions when he wrote about the 
above-mentioned visit by Tildy. It occurred to him that “the Russians wanted to make a 
good impression on the Vatican with this proposal”, and wanted him to convey the good 
48 OSzKK, 216. f., c. u. 19, fol. 300–303, The Diary of P. Nagy, Töhötöm S. J. Rome, 23 October 1945; ibidem, c. 
u. 48, fol. 5, “Jelentés a 2. római tartózkodásom alatt elért eredményekről (1945. október 11–november 19.).”, 
Rome, 21 November 1945, signed as “Alessandro” [=P. Nagy, Töhötöm], addressed to Prince Primate József 
Mindszenty.
49 Politikatörténeti és Szakszervezeti Levéltár (The Archives of Political History and Trade Unions), 274. f., c. u. 
7/247, fol. 39–42.
50  BEKE, 66. The minutes of the Conference of the Bench of Bishops, convened for 20 December 1945. (In the 
minutes 13 November 1945 is mentioned as the date of the meeting but it is a typist’s mistake, because as Prime 
Minister Tildy could not visit Mindszenty then, since he came into office only two days later, on 15 November. 
In other sources, for example in the Memoirs of Mindszenty, the Prime Minister’s visit is correctly dated as 16 
November.) 
51 József MINDSZENTY, Emlékirataim, Budapest 1989, 109.
52 Ibidem – According to the special literature, the quoted contents are also attached to the first visit. See for 
example: Jenő GERGELY, A 20. században (1918–1995), in: Magyarország és a Szentszék kapcsolatának ezer éve, 
István ZOMBORI (ed.), Budapest 1996, 276; LOMBARDI, 103; GERGELY, 2006, 79.
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news in order to counterbalance his reports, revealing anti-religious manifestations.53
In the scene of the papal audience, as reconstructed a few decades later, the events of the 
two visits are merged. In December 1945 Mindszenty might have had some faint suspicion 
but he had no real reason to question the reliability of the new Hungarian government and 
that it served Hungarian interests. Two days after his return from Rome he informed the 
Prime Minister that the Vatican welcomed the initiative to re-establish diplomatic relations, 
“there was no impediment to the re-establishment of relations” on the behalf of the Holy 
See, and it considered sending Archbishop Angelo Rotta, former Nuncio to Budapest. 
“The Holy See assumes that the Nuncio fulfils the same role and position in the diplomatic 
corps as in the past and everywhere else”54 – this sentence referred to the title of ‘doyen’, 
the precedence in the diplomatic corps, a role which became a tradition in the Catholic 
countries. The gesture that they wanted Rotta to return to Budapest reflected the view-
point of the Holy See: diplomatic relations are continuous, did not break ‘de iure’.
The Prince Primate expressed similar views to the members of the Bench of Bishops. Re-
turning from Rome after his first visit, he did not say anything regarding his misgivings; he 
rather urged the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. His explanation of world poli-
tics was the only concept he did not share with the public: “nothing has changed in the 
strained relations between the Vatican and the Soviet Union and there is no chance of it 
for the time being. The Vatican has great missionary expectations for the distant future.”55 
Töhötöm P. Nagy, Jesuit, who had been to Rome a few weeks before the Prince Primate, 
viewed and assessed the Eastern-European policy of the Vatican somewhat differently. His 
news came mainly from the confidants of the Pope, among others from another Jesuit, P. 
Robert Leibert, the private secretary of Pope Pius XII. He said that “the Vatican wants to 
establish relations with Moscow under any circumstances”. Over time it set several diplo-
matic channels into motion: first the Internuncio of Ankara years ago, then the representa-
tive of the late American President, Roosevelt and at present both sides are trying to come 
closer together through Stockholm. Therefore it is unpleasant for Rome if certain prelates 
aggravate the situation56 – and although unsaid, it was a reference to the electoral circular57 
53 MINDSZENTY, 105.
54 ”…I informed the Vatican about the decision of the government of the Hungarian Kingdom to attempt the 
re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican.” According to the letter, the Vatican do not see any im-
pediment and they consider sending Angelo Rotta. EPL Processus Joseph Card. Mindszenty, V-700/27, fol. 247, 
The letter of József Mindszenty to Prime Minister Zoltán Tildy. Esztergom, 15 December 1945. (The handwritten 
draft of the same letter: ÁBTL 3.1.9. V-700/32, fol. 1.); EPL V-700/27, fol. 246 and ÁBTL 3.1.9. V-700/32, fol. 4. 
[11.], No. 4045/1945 letter of József Mindszenty to Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi. Budapest, 20 December 
1945. Typewritten copy. 
55 BEKE, 65. The minutes of the conference of the Bench of Bishops, convened for 20 December 1945, No. 2 
item on the agenda. 
56 OSzKK, 216. f., c. u. 19, fol. 313–314, The diary of P. Nagy, Töhötöm S. J. Rome, 1 November 1945.
57 The pastoral letter, released on 18 October 1945 on the occasion of the approaching National Assembly elec-
tions, was signed by the Primate but it was published on behalf of the Hungarian Bench of Bishops. It directed 
justifiable and serious criticism at the developments in domestic politics, implicitly calling on believers to support 
the Smallholders; thus it promoted the unification of the civic forces. This pastoral letter was the first to reveal pu-
blicly the constraints and crisis of the Hungarian democracy. As reasons for the crisis it indicated the disregard of 
natural law, denial of God, the Communist party policy and the abuses by the police. On account of its contents, 
the political parties regarded the pastoral letter as an unprecedented intervention in politics and the electoral 
campaign. See the published text of the pastoral letter: József VECSEY (ed.), Mindszenty okmánytár. Pásztorleve-
lek, beszédek, nyilatkozatok. Vol. 1. Mindszenty tanítása. Munich 1957, 70–76.
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of the Primate, which was criticized by the political parties. The Father reached a similar 
conclusion after the Papal audience of 23 October: the Vatican adopted the pursuit of a 
‘modus vivendi’ with the Soviets.58
Nevertheless, Pius XII did not have illusions about the nature of the Soviet system and its 
objectives of conquering Central- and Eastern Europe. The danger of the spread of com-
munism, the responsibility towards the Catholic believers of Russia and the lack of confi-
dence in Stalin’s words urged him to seek an effective remedy against the danger threaten-
ing Western – Christian Civilization. Nevertheless, the Eastern policy of the Holy See was 
differentiated and complex and it did not make a total commitment; it tried to retain its 
neutrality, balancing between the two political blocs. “The nature of the reaction against 
communism is ethic and religious in the first place, and political in the second place” – can 
be read in the memorandum, consisting of instructions for the Nuncios, prepared by the 
Secretariat of State in January 1948.59 
It seemed for outsiders that there was an agreement and that the Nunciature could restart its 
work soon. Meanwhile another, apparently minor problem arose: the question of the Nun-
cio’s being the ‘doyen’. Since 1815, when in Vienna an international system of diplomatic 
ranks was established, the Ambassador of the Pope – who was called ‘decanus’ or ‘doyen’, 
i.e. first or senior – has taken precedence in the diplomatic corps, irrespective of the date 
when he presented his credentials. In Catholic countries this tradition has always been kept 
and usually in other countries, too. After 1945 the first foreign diplomat appointed to Hun-
gary was none other than Grigory Maksimovich Puskin, Soviet Ambassador… All of a sud-
den the usual diplomatic choreography became a matter of prestige for an atheist empire 
and the Catholic Church.60 The Vatican could have been generous and stated: the re-estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations with Hungary does not depend on this matter. To all appear-
ances the only open point was the timing of the re-opening of the Nunciature in Budapest. 
József Mindszenty visited Rome for the second time when he was elevated to Cardinal. 
Then he submitted a written report on the Hungarian situation, in which he repeated the 
Hungarian government’s desire to “the re-establish public diplomatic relations between 
Hungary and the Holy See” but this time he expressed his misgivings as well. At least the 
answer, dated on 14 March, clearly refers to it: “I guess I do not have to say that His Holi-
ness agrees with such a desire” – started Montini the answer, agreeing with the essence; 
then after a Baroque-style period he responded to the reservations: “since you had your 
doubts, it must be examined whether there are any obstacles in connection with the pro-
58  OSzKK, 216. f., c. u. 19, fol. 300–303, Diary of P. Nagy, Töhötöm S. J. Rome, 23 October 1945, ibidem, c. 
u. 48, fol. 10, „Jelentés a 2. római tartózkodásom alatt elért eredményekről (1945. október 11–november 19.)”, 
Rome, 21 November 1945, signed as “Alessandro” [= P. Nagy, Töhötöm], addressed to Prince Primate József 
Mindszenty.
59 CHENAUX, 173–174.
60 There has been a similar case when in Germany in 1929, after the resignation of Nuncio Pacelli, Krestinsky 
Russian Ambassador became Senior. With the appointment of the new Nuncio, the question arose whether he 
could be considered ‘decanus natus’, which was refused only by Japan and Soviet Russia. (The situation had an 
added piquancy, because the Russian Ambassador, who aspired to be a ‘doyen’, represented such a country, 
Soviet Russia, which was not recognized by some of the states that had diplomatic missions in Germany.) See: 
Zsuzsa B. LŐRINCZ (ed.), A vatikáni magyar követ jelenti…, Budapest 1969, 195.
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posal.”61
Mindszenty lost confidence in the sincerity of the intentions of the new government in Feb-
ruary of 1946; there had been no sound reasons for it earlier, at the end of 1945. The events 
before his second visit to Rome radically changed his opinion about the government: in 
his view the codification of the republican government was a coup d’état. Law I of 1946 
was enacted by the National Assembly on 31 January 1946: the monarchy was abolished 
and Hungary was declared a republic. Mindszenty thought that the smooth relationship 
between state and Church was endangered; in his view the ideal form of government had 
been and was the monarchy, in which the constitutional role of the Prince Primate was root-
ed, too. Thus we think that the Prince Primate’s misgivings regarding the re-establishment 
of the Nunciature originated in the adoption of the republican government. Although in 
his Memoirs he did not give full details of his suspicions, it is clear that according to him, 
the Hungarian government tried to make a good impression on the Vatican by the re-es-
tablishment of the Nunciature. Mindszenty thought that both the Soviet and the Hungarian 
government wanted to use the accreditation of a Nuncio for their self-justification, disguis-
ing their anti-religious intentions. Giving his opinion, Mindszenty practically dissuaded the 
Pope from the immediate re-establishment of diplomatic relations, whilst in the long term 
he was interested in unhindered contact with the Holy See, because in the absence of a 
Nuncio the Hungarian Church remained isolated from Rome. 
It seems that by the spring – summer of 1946 the Vatican had lost its first enthusiasm to-
wards the revival of relations and they worried that the government’s letter of intent had 
been addressed to Esztergom instead of Rome. It was interpreted as meaning that the 
government did not take a substantive initiative. 
Ultimately, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Holy See was hindered not 
only by political reflections – especially not by those of Hungarian domestic policy – but 
by considerations of Soviet power and ideology. The ACC gave permission to establish 
diplomatic relations with different states, one after the other: by the summer of 1946 with 
Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Switzerland and the Spanish government-in-exile but not with the 
Holy See. Thus the Hungarian Embassy in Rome could establish a connection with the Holy 
See indirectly only, through the Holy See Ambassador accredited to Italy.62
The events of Hungarian domestic policy during the first half of the year 1946 indicated 
the end of religious tolerance. On 4 July 1946 László Rajk, Minister of Interior ordered the 
dissolution of the ethico-religious associations, thus paralyzing denominational youth work. 
The most important victim of the measure was the KALOT (Katolikus Agrárifjúsági Legény-
egyletek Országos Testülete, National Association of Rural Catholic Young Men) and its 
Jesuit leaders believed in the possibility of a ‘modus vivendi’ until the last moment. “I’ve 
61 EPL, Processus Joseph Card. Mindszenty, V-700/30, fol. 80–81, G. B. Montini substitutus, letter No. 110.941. 
to Cardinal Archbishop József Mindszenty. Vatican, 14 March 1946. Original, autograph. In Hungarian; concerning 
style it is different from the version published in our paper. EPL, Processus Joseph Card. Mindszenty, V-700/30, fol. 
79–80; carbon copy, ibidem, V-700/27, fol. 249. (Duplicate: ÁBTL 3.1.9. V-700/30. and V-700/27.)
62 MNL–OL, XIX-J-1-u, Documents of János Gyöngyösi, c. u. 6 (Box No. 24). “The memorandums of Foreign 
Minister Gyöngyösi.” Memorandum on the visit of Augusto Assettati, Italian Chargé d’Affaires. Budapest, 23 
October 1946. 
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got two requests: the readmission of the Nunciature and an invitation for me to Moscow”63 
– was written in his diary by Töhötöm Nagy, Jesuit priest, who was in Hungary again. To this 
end on 6 September 1946 he had a long talk with Boris Pavlovich Osokin, the deputy politi-
cal adviser of the ASS. Earlier the Soviet political officer had explained on several occasions 
that he considered Mindszenty the vanguard of the Vatican, who followed the directives of 
Rome. According to Osokin, the Primate would regard the readmission of the Nunciature 
as his own success and this advantage should not be granted to him. “Everyone would say 
that the Russians yielded to the rigorousness of the Prince Primate. They will never do this, 
though.”64 On the Jesuit–Soviet talks the matter of the Nunciature arose for the last time 
on 18 October 1946 and it became obvious that the modus vivendi was not on the agen-
da anymore. A few days later Töhötöm Nagy left Hungary. In the view of the Holy See the 
pro-Moscow period of reflection had ended with a failure. 
In 1945–46 the Hungarian Catholic Church pushed hard the settlement of diplomatic rela-
tions but from the second half of 1946 its political reality decreased dramatically, partly be-
cause the divide widened between the Prince Primate and the government. Mátyás Rákosi, 
Deputy Prime Minister, the head of the Hungarian Communist Party said that the Nuncia-
ture must not return, because “then there would be two Mindszentys in the country instead 
of one”, whose provocative gestures would be supported by the Vatican.65 The Holy See 
did not put a lot of effort into revitalising the relationships, either. While in 1919 it showed 
willingness to establish diplomatic relations with Hungary before the signing of the Trianon 
Peace Treaty, now it cautiously waited. The presence of the Red Army gave rise to mistrust 
and it increased when the brutality of the Soviet Church policy became manifest in relation 
to the elimination of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which was completed by 1947. 
The following turning point in the relationship between the Holy See and Hungary was 
when some tentative steps were taken in the first half of 1947 in order to restore the au-
thority of the government, which was undermined in the dispute on facultative religious 
instruction. At first István Kertész, Ambassador, later László Tóth, Rector of the University of 
Szeged was entrusted with the task of sounding out the possibilities.
The re-establishment of formal relations between the Holy See and the Vatican, desired 
both by the Hungarian government and a large section of the public, extended beyond 
Hungarian domestic policy; it reflected the conflict of interests of the great powers and met 
with intense resistance from the Soviet politicians. According to the French Ambassador to 
Budapest, the implacability of the Soviets originated in their antipathy towards the head of 
the Hungarian Catholic Church, Price Primate József Mindszenty, because the Primate was 
the leader of the opposition not only against the Hungarian government and communist 
influence but also against Soviet control. “The Cardinal plays this dangerous role without 
moderation; he is more and more careless about his language and behaviour and causes 
problems for the Hungarian government, which is saddened at the thought that the Vati-
can put this prelate at the top of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy in a defeated, devastat-
63 OSzKK, 216. f., c. u. 20, fol. 14, The Diary of P. Nagy, Töhötöm, 1 September 1946. 
64 OSzKK, 216. f., c. u. 20, fol. 21, The Diary of P. Nagy, Töhötöm, 1 September 1946.
65 OSzKK, 216. f., c. u. 50, “Jelentés a magyar katolicizmus helyzetéről. 1946. november 5-ig bezárólag.” Written 
by Nagy, Töhötöm S. J., Rome, 12 November 1946. 
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ed and occupied Hungary.”66 In addition there was another problem, comparable in gravity 
to all this: the apparent pro-American attitude of the Vatican; or the other way round, the 
rapprochement of the Protestant-majority United States with the Vatican that was demon-
strated in different ways. For example, in 1946 Mindszenty travelled to the Consistory in 
Rome by an American military aircraft; Hlond, Polish Cardinal held a press conference in 
the USA Embassy to Warsaw;67 and often American citizens were the heads of the Vatican 
Missions in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, such as Hurley, Nuncio to Belgrade and 
O’Hara, Nuncio to Bucharest. Thus they were not only under the protection of the Holy 
See but under the protection of the United States as well, which had considerably greater 
power and influence. Despite these manifestations of cordiality, before 1948 the Holy See 
and the United States did not have diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, because of the com-
mon communist enemy, the rapprochement of Rome and Washington was advantageous: 
the Pope was the moral leader of the anti-communist front, while America represented the 
political power, capable of significant resistance to Bolshevism.
In the circumstances it seemed hopeless to persuade the Soviets that the presence of a 
Nuncio, who was endowed with political awareness, could only improve the situation. In 
the French diplomacy’s views the Soviet authorities thought the opposite: namely, “there 
would be more difficulties if a more flexible and enlightened Nuncio joined the obstinate 
and narrow-minded Cardinal”.68 That is why the news spread in diplomatic circles that 
Ambassador István Kertész had tried to persuade the Vatican to appoint Mindszenty to 
Curial Cardinal and with this at least the main personal impediment to the establishment 
of relations would be removed. The issue remained on the agenda until December of 
1948. However, the Secretariat of State had up-to-date information about the political cri-
sis in Budapest, which ended with the enforced resignation of Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, 
whose party, the Independent Smallholders Party was at an advanced stage of decompo-
sition. In this uncertain internal situation all efforts towards an agreement were illusory and 
would not have justified the removal of the Cardinal Archbishop. 
The situation changed when the Peace Treaty entered into force on 15 September 1947. 
Under the new circumstances the country was represented by László Velics, Hungarian 
Ambassador to Rome, because his predecessor, István Kertész had emigrated to France 
after the resignation of Ferenc Nagy. All efforts to start communication with the Vatican and 
re-establish diplomatic relations with the Holy See had failed by this time and envoys had 
been sent in vain. Pope Pius XII had known Velics personally for two decades; they had met 
in Germany where the future Pope served as a Nuncio, while Velics was the Secretary of the 
Hungarian Institute in Munich as well as a Consul General. He was chosen for the position 
of the Ambassador to Rome because of the supposedly amicable nexus. There were very 
high expectations of him, so the subsequent failure was really disappointing. 
66 Archives du Ministères des Affaires étrangères (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; hereinafter referred 
only as AMAE), Série: Europe, 1944-1960, sous-série: Hongrie, dossier: 18. Questions religieuses, 1944–1949. 
13v. The report of Henry Gauquié, French Ambassador to Hungary, No. 157/EU, 16 April 1947. 
67 MNL–OL, XIX-I-1-v, Documents of Ortutay, 3-c item/9 (Box No. 38) Press material, Die Weltwoche, 3 March 
[1948 or 1949].
68 AMAE, Série: Europe, 1944-1960, sous-série: Hongrie, dossier: 18. Questions religueuses, 1944–1949. 13v. 
The report of Henry Gauquié, French Ambassador to Hungary, No. 157/EU, 16 April 1947. 
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In October of 1947 Velics presented his credentials and almost immediately sought to 
inform the Holy See: “with the cessation of the ACC in Hungary, we have a free hand to 
establish diplomatic relations. All relevant political factors wish the re-establishment of our 
diplomatic relations with the Vatican as soon as possible.”69 He waited for the response of 
the Holy See confidently and calmly, and he was very disappointed by the definite answer 
that he got on 5 November 1947: “the Holy See does not believe that the time has come 
for starting negotiations with the Hungarian Government and for the re-establishment of 
diplomatic relations. It is of the opinion that the Hungarian Government does not have full 
freedom of action, although through no fault of its own.”70 The Pope did not even receive 
him on an audience, arguing that he was not allowed to receive an ambassador accredited 
to the Italian Republic.71 It was an ill-concealed refusal of any rapprochement. 
In January of 1948 iterative, unofficial negotiations started between the Hungarian Gov-
ernment and the representatives of the Catholic Church. Gyula Czapik, Archbishop of Eger 
recorded his impressions on the first meeting: “Perspective goal and title: the Concordat. 
Immediate goal: its preparation and laying down the foundations of the relationship could 
be a modus vivendi. I do not think about concluding an agreement.”72 
On learning about the negotiations, at the beginning of March 1948 Pope Pius XII re-
ceived on an audience László Velics, Hungarian Ambassador to Rome – that was the first 
occasion since the Ambassador’s arrival to Rome. At the audience Pius XII asked the dip-
lomat whether his mandate to conduct negotiations on the relations between the Holy 
See and Hungary was still valid. After the ambassador’s affirmative answer he said in strict 
confidence that “he would be willing to start diplomatic intercourse”73 and explained the 
viewpoint of the Holy See: ensuring the pedagogic role of the Church, authorisation of the 
Catholic Church and Catholic associations. Velics proposed to send a Vatican personage to 
Hungary in order to obtain information. These views meant a turning point after the earlier 
reticence. 
Having analysed the dialogue, one can draw two conclusions: 1) The Holy See regarded 
the political transformation of East-Central Europe as a status quo and did not expect rapid 
change. From earlier statements of the Vatican it was clear that the Holy See was willing to 
conclude Concordats with mature, functioning states, irrespective of their political hue, in 
order to promote the interests of the Catholic Church. 2) With the negotiations the Holy 
See wanted to help Hungarian Catholicism but it not calculate upon the conclusion of a 
Concordat. There are pros and cons of both conclusions. Whatever the reality was, there 
69 MNL–OL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán-IV-14-487/pol. res./1947 (Box No. 1), “Magyarország és a Vatikán közötti kapcso-
latok” The Report of the Hungarian Ambassador to Rome, László Velics to Foreign Minister Erik Molnár. Rome, 7 
November 1947.
70 Ibidem.
71 AMAE, Série: Europe, 1944-1960, sous-série: Hongrie, dossier: 18. Questions religieuses, 1944–1949. 20r–v. 
The report of Henry Gauquié, French Ambassador to Hungary, addressed to the Foreign Minister, No. 40/EU, 24 
January 1948. 
72 Magyar Piarista Rendtartomány Központi Levéltára (Central Archives of the Hungarian Province of the Piarist 
Order), the bequest of István Albert, item No. 4, File “Egyház és állam – tárgyalások”, Pro memoria about the 
discussion of 7 February 1948.
73 MNL–OL, XIX-I-1-v, 3-c item/4. (Box No. 38) More recent happenings of the relationship between Hungary and 
the Holy See. Report of Zoltán Halász. Rome, 7 March 1948.
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is no news about the resumption of the audience; when the nationalization of schools was 
admittedly put on the agenda, contact was suspended again. Nevertheless, the viable and 
satisfactory settlement of Church–state relations could have been achieved only by a direct 
agreement between the Hungarian state and Rome. 
It was a serious mistake for the Hungarian Communist politicians to assume that the Apos-
tolic See would conclude an agreement with the Hungarian Republic, without considering 
the real situation of Hungarian Catholics and the actions to be taken in this regard. During 
1948 there was no progress in this field, on the contrary, the state–Church relationship 
aggravated at a rapid pace. The uncompromising attitude of Cardinal Primate Mindszenty 
played a key role in this process: he refused any compromise on behalf of the relentless 
fight against Communism and Bolshevism. Nevertheless, the Bench of Bishops was not ho-
mogenous; similarly to the rest of society there was a fault line: some of them thought that 
there was a need for a ‘modus vivendi’, because they took into account the long-lasting 
settlement of the Soviets in Central-Europe. They wanted to establish a role for Catholicism 
in the new historical situation by means of clever negotiations. However, by the end of 
1948 there was no chance for an agreement. 
The government put the blame on Cardinal Mindszenty for these disappointments, and 
with some justification. After the leaders of the Hungarian opposition had fled from the 
country, Mindszenty remained the only one who had the courage of his convictions and 
protested. In the autumn of 1948 it became more and more obvious that the power would 
swoop on the Cardinal. It must be admitted that Mindszenty had some vulnerable spots. 
He was criticised, because he did not recognize the Republic. Although he did not make 
any statement, which would justify this criticism, his actions – or rather the lack of certain 
actions – show that the criticism was not baseless. He refused to visit the President of the 
Republic, returned the President’s letters unopened, he was not willing to communicate 
with the authorities of the new regime and he refused to draw a salary from the state. “We 
respect his courage, his resolute character and the dignity of his behaviour but you have 
to admit that some priests and the best informed Catholic elements of the country disap-
prove of his intransigency, narrow-mindedness, authoritarian and tactless frame of mind, 
his ability to provoke incidents and last but not least, his reactionary mentality in the strict 
meaning of the word. The arrogance, the refusal of accepting a fait accompli; the “no, 
no, never”, which is honourable to some extent but too risky. The feudal Hungarian of the 
Horthy-era is embodied in this Prelate, who does not even have aristocratic ancestors. (…) 
It seems that he shares the vision of those, who think that there has not been a legitimate 
Hungarian government since the fall of Horthy, and the recent system is based on the 
bayonets of the occupying forces.”74 – as the Cardinal was characterized by the French 
Ambassador to Budapest. 
During the search of the Archiepiscopal Palace on 23 December 1948, many documents 
were found hidden in a metal casing, for example a summary of the meeting of the Exec-
utive Committee of Budapest of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, held on 3 November 1948. 
(Apparently, the information flowed not only towards the state security.) So the Cardinal 
74 AMAE, Série: Europe, 1944-1960, sous-série: Hongrie, dossier: 18. Questions religieuses, 1944–1949. 20v. 
The report of Henry Gauquié, French Ambassador to Hungary, addressed to the Foreign Minister, No. 40/EU, 24 
January 1948. 
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must have realised that the hour has come and the crusade against the priesthood and 
obviously against him was imminent. General Secretary Mátyás Rákosi personally attended 
the party forum and delivered a lecture. He declared that the democracy had replaced its 
earlier defensive policy with a full-scale offensive against the Catholic Church. “The weap-
ons needed in the fight will be the same as the weapons used against the Communists in 
the years of illegality. And these will be used without mercy. No matter where and how the 
clerical reaction tries to survive, it has to face the iron-bound power of democracy. No more 
warnings will be given to the Church. The priests who speak about politics on the pulpit will 
be put in an internment camp or prison immediately… Up to now the state wanted to bring 
a Nuncio to Budapest; now the Vatican would want to send him but the democracy does 
not need the delegate of the Vatican anymore.”75 At that time an Atlanticist idea prevailed 
in the Vatican, which opposed any compromise with the Soviet bloc. Some members of 
the Bench of Bishops as well as the Prince Primate, who was convicted and waited for the 
judgment of the Court of Second Instance, tried to resume the negotiations but all these 
attempts failed. The legal liaison with the Vatican was cut between 1949 and 1962. The 
communication with foreign-based institutes was permitted only through the State Office 
for Church Affairs, which was established in 1950 in order to mediate and execute Church 
policy and supervise the Churches. The conditions of a rapprochement were created at the 
beginning of the 1960s. On the one hand, the Kádár-government showed more tolerance 
towards the Hungarian Catholic Church, which was on the edge of viability; on the other, 
the “aggiornamento” of the Universal Church and the commitment of the Vatican to efforts 
for world peace opened the door to the resumption of the negotiations in 1963. Even in 
the years following the Helsinki Declaration the establishment of diplomatic relations was 
impossible, because it was vetoed by the Soviets which had binding force in every country 
of the Soviet bloc. The initiatives to resume or retain the diplomatic relations failed in the 
other Eastern or Central-European countries, too. The Vatican’s scepticism and its lack of 
motivation to continue the negotiations might have contributed to it; but the main cause 
behind this failure lay in Stalin’s decision to sovietize East-Central Europe. 
Abstract
Diplomatic relations are established by the Holy See and not by the Vatican, therefore it is 
accurate to speak about the diplomatic relations of the Holy See and not that of the Vati-
can. This analysis would like to outline how the representatives of the Holy See, assigned to 
the East-Central European countries, could work in the new political situation after World 
War II. It tries to set it in the context of the new social, political and geographical field, 
which this region entered as an area occupied by the Red Army.
In the interwar period the Holy See concluded concordats with some countries of the 
East-Central European region (with Poland, Romania, the German Reich, Austria and the 
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; it signed a ‘modus vivendi’ with Czechoslova-
kia and concluded the Lateran Treaty with Italy). In the case of Hungary, a so-called ‘intesa 
semplice’ entered into force in 1927 that was not a bilateral, international treaty, this is why 
75 ÁBTL, 3.1.9. V-700/11, fol. 324/8–9, Confidential memo, found in the material of the house search at Mind-
szenthy [!].
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it is called “simple agreement”. 
Yet in general it is true that between 1944/45 and 1947/48 it was in the interests of nearly 
every East-Central European government to show religious tolerance to some extent and 
maintain connections with the Holy See. Marxism was not an insurmountable obstacle 
for the Holy See, since it had diplomatic relations with Muslim countries as well. Rome 
distinguishes between governments and ideologies; namely, it represents an intransigent 
position as regards ethical or religious principles, at the same time it does not refuse to en-
ter into negotiations with any political figure or group. However, in the long run the Papal 
Nunciatures were not allowed to remain in the countries of the Soviet sphere of influence, 
whether or not the given country was on the winning or losing side of the war.
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ic relations, Nunciature, Apostolic Nuncio, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, 
Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Prince Primate József Mindszenty, Hungarian Catholic Church
References
Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára (ÁBTL)
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security
f. 3.1.9. V-700
Archives du Ministères des Affaires étrangères (AMAE)
Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Série: Europe, 1944-1960, sous-série: Hongrie
Arhiv Vniesniey Politiki Rossiyskoy Federacii (AVP RF)
The Interior Politics Archive of Russian Fedeation
f. 06., f. 56b
Gosudarstvennyj Arhiv Rossiskoj Federacii (GARF)
The Russian Federation State Archive 
f. 6410, f. 6991 
Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL–OL)
The State Archives of The National Archives of Hungary
f. XIX-J-1-j-Szovjetunió-IV-270, XIX-J-1-j, XIX-J-1-u, XIX-I-1-v 
Magyar Piarista Rendtartomány Központi Levéltára 
Central Archives of the Hungarian Province of the Piarist Order
The bequest of István Albert
Prímási Levéltár, Esztergom (EPL)
Esztergom Primatial Archives
Processus Joseph Card. Mindszenty: V-700/27, V-700/30, V-700/32
Politikatörténeti és Szakszervezeti Levéltár (PSL) 
The Archives of Political History and Trade Unions
f. 274
113CENTRAL EUROPEAN PAPERS 2014 / II / 1
Országos Széchényi Könyvtár Kézirattára (OSzKK)
National Széchényi Library, Manuscript Collection (OSzKK)
f. 216 
L’Osservatore Romano, 1948, Year 88, No. 154.
A katolikus egyház Csehszlovákiában, in: L’Osservatore Romano, 88, 1948, 154, 5–6.
BALOGH, Margit: A szentszéki–magyar kapcsolatok a koalíció (1945–1949) éveiben, in: 
Magyarország és a római Szentszék. Magyarország és a római Szentszék. (Források és 
távlatok.) Tanulmányok Erdő bíboros tiszteletére, Budapest–Róma 2012 (Bibliotheca 
historiae ecclesiasticae Universitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány nuncupatae. Series 1., 
Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae. Classis 1/8.), 367–426.
BEKE, Margit (ed.): A magyar katolikus püspökkari tanácskozások története és jegyzőkönyvei 
1945–1948 között, Köln–Budapest 1996.
CSIZMADIA, Andor: A magyar állam és az egyházak jogi kapcsolatainak alakulása és 
gyakorlata a Horthy-korszakban, Budapest 1966.
ERDŐ, Péter: A Szentszék és Magyarország, in: Katolikus Szemle, 43, 1991, 3–4, 140–148.
FEIGE, Gerhard: Bulgarien, in: Kirche und Katholizismus seit 1945, II. Ostmittel-, Ost- und 
Südosteuropa, GATZ, Erwin (ed.), Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich 1999, 56–61.
GERGELY, Jenő: A 20. században (1918–1995), in: Magyarország és a Szentszék 
kapcsolatának ezer éve, ZOMBORI, István (ed.), Budapest 1996, 255–292.
GERGELY, Jenő: A magyarországi katolikus egyház és a külpolitika (1948–1990), in: Magyar 
külpolitikai gondolkodás a 20. században, PRITZ, Pál (ed.), Budapest 2006,  39–59.
CHENAUX, Philipe: L’Église catholique et communisme en Europe (1917–1989). De Lénine 
à Jean-Paul II, Paris 2009.
ISPÁNKI, Béla: Az évszázad pere, Abaliget 1995.
KAPLAN, Karel: Stát a církev v Československu. 1948–1953, Brno 1994.
KŁOCZOWSKI, Jerzy – MŰLLEROWA, Lidia – SKARBEK, Jan: A katolikus egyház 
Lengyelországban, Budapest 1994 (Ecclesia Sancta 8.).
Konkordat zawarty pomiędzy Stolicą Apostolską a Rzecząpospolitą Polską podpisany w 
Rzymie dnia 10 lutego 1925 r., Lwów 1925.
Konkordátum a Szentszék és a Német Birodalom között (1933. július 20.), in: NÉMETH, 
István, Demokrácia és diktatúra Németországban, 1918–1945 2. kötet. A „Harmadik 
Birodalom”, 1933–1945. Összegzés és dokumentumok, Budapest 2007.
KOPIEC, Jan: Polen, in: Kirche und Katholizismus seit 1945. Band 2. Ostmittel-, Ost- und 
Südosteuropa, GATZ, Erwin (ed.), Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich 1999, 95–131.
LOMBARDI, Lapo: La Santa Sede e i cattolici dell’Europa Orientale agli albori della guerra 
fredda, Róma–Budapest 1997.
LŐRINCZ, Zsuzsa B. (ed.): A vatikáni magyar követ jelenti…, Budapest 1969.
MINDSZENTY, József: Emlékirataim, Budapest 1989.
Modus vivendi. Úmluva mezi republikou Československou a Svatou stolicí zjednána v lednu 
1928 [online]. http://spcp.prf.cuni.cz/dokument/modus.htm (Visited: 18 February 2012).
MRKONJIĆ, Tomislav: Archivio della Nunziatura Apostolica in Ungheria (1920–1939). Gli 
archivi della Santa Sede e il Regno d’Ungheria (secc. 15–20). A cura di Gaetano Platania 
– Matteo Sanfilippo – Péter Tusor, Budapest–Roma 2008. (Bibliotheca Historiae 
Ecclesiasticae Uiversitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány Nuncupatae. Ser. 1., Collectanea 
Vaticana Hungariae. Classis 1.).
114 Diplomatic Missions of the Holy See in Hungaryand East-Central Europe after the Second World WarMargit BALOGH
ARTICLES
POLZOVICS, Iván: A lateráni szerződés. A szentszék nemzetközi jogi helyzete, Budapest 
1934 (Szt. István könyvek 114.) [online]. http://www.ppek.hu/konyvek/Polzovics_Ivan_A_ 
laterani_szerzodes_1.pdf (Visited: 28 May 2014).
RÓNAY, Miklós: A Szentszék és a Vatikán Városállam viszonya a közbeszédben és a jogban, 
Külügyi Szemle Vol. 3, 2004, 271–298.
RÓNAY, Miklós: Az egységesség elve a katolikus egyház külügyi tevékenységében. PhD 
dissertation, Corvinus University, Budapest 2006.
SKAROVSKI, Mikhail, V.: Russkaia Pravoslavnija Cerkov pri Staline i Khrushceve 
(gosudarstvennoje-cerkovnie otnoseniya v SSSR v 1939–1964 godah), Moscow 2005. 
STEHLE, Hansjakob: Geheimdiplomatie im Vatikan. Die Päpste und die Kommunisten, 
Zürich 1993.
SZUROMI, Szabolcs Anzelm: Egyházi intézménytörténet, Budapest 2003.
TÖRÖK József (ed.): Grősz József kalocsai érsek naplója 1944–1946. S. a. r., Budapest, n. 
d. [1995], 192.
TUSOR, Péter (ed.): Magyarország és a római Szentszék. (Források és távlatok.) Tanulmányok 
Erdő bíboros tiszteletére, Budapest–Róma 2012 (Bibliotheca historiae ecclesiasticae 
Universitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány nuncupatae. Series 1., Collectanea Vaticana 
Hungariae. Classis 1/8.).
VASILE, Cristian: The Apostolic Nunciature in Romania at the beginning of the communist 
regime, in: Instituto Romeno Di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica (Venezia) Annuario Vol. 4, 
MARIN, Şerban – BULEI, Ion – DINU, Rudolf (eds.), Bucarest 2002, 255–261.
VECSEY, József (ed.): Mindszenty okmánytár. Pásztorlevelek, beszédek, nyilatkozatok. Vol. 
1. Mindszenty tanítása, Munich 1957.
VOLK, Ludwig: Das Reichskonkordat vom 20. Juli 1933. Von den Ansätzen in der Weimarer 
Republik bis zur Ratifizierung am 10. September 1933, Mainz 1972. (Veröffentlichungen 
der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte, Reihe B: Forschungen, Bd. 5).
VOLOKITINA, Tatiana – MURAŠKO, Galina – NOSKOVA, Albina: Moskva i Vostochnaya 
Evropa. Vlasty i cerkov v period obsestvennih transformacii 40–50-h godov XX veka, 
Moscow 2008. 
ZOMBORI, István (ed.): Le relazioni diplomatiche tra l’Ungheria e la Santa Sede 1920–2000, 
Budapest 2001.
ZOMBORI, István (ed.): Magyarország és a Szentszék kapcsolatának ezer éve, Budapest 
1996.
http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bmazzoli.html (Visited: 28 May 2014).
